Introduction
The relationship between natural resource abundance and economic performance has been the subject of much academic debate. Prior to the 1980s, the conventional wisdom was that natural resource abundance was a contributing factor to economic growth. In an influential study, Rostow (1961) argued that natural resource endowments would enable developing countries to make the transition from underdevelopment to industrial "takeoff" just as they had done for countries such as Australia and the United States. Similar views were expressed by Balassa (1980) and Krueger (1980) .
A number of studies have since challenged this view, arguing that the abundance of natural resources leads to poor economic performance (Wheeler 1984; Auty 1993; Warner 1995, 1997; Gylfason et al. 1999 ), more civil wars (Reynal-Querol 2002) , poorer quality of political institutions (Wantchekon 1999; Ross 2001) , and higher corruption (Leite and Weidmann 1999).
A small but growing literature suggests that natural resource abundance may lead to poorer quality of economic institutions. First, governments in resource rich countries are less dependent on public taxation for their revenue, which makes them less accountable to the people and less interested in reform (Luciani 1987 , Chaudhry 1994 , Karl 1997 , Moore 2000 , 2004 . As Luciani (1987) succinctly puts it, rentier states do "not need to formulate anything deserving the appellation of economic policy." Second, the availability of large rents from the extraction of natural resources tends to increase the reward for political agents from rent-seeking activity and thus diverts talent from industry to the bureaucracy (Tovrik 2002 , Auty 2001b . Third, greater concentration of wealth that tends to accompany greater abundance of natural resources tends to erode social capital, a necessary ingredient for generating consensus on reforms (Isham et al. 2002 , Rodrik 1999a ).
We contribute to this strand of the literature by analyzing the relationship between natural resource abundance and micro economic reforms. The analysis is done on a sample of 133 countries, with data on reforms from the World Bank's Doing Business project. Previous studies have shown these reforms to expand growth (for example, Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006) and Barseghyan (2008) ).
Our data are not subject to the criticisms of other measures of economic institutions, which suffer from significant endogeneity issues, and measure outcomes rather than institutions (for example, Glaeser et al. 2004 ). The Doing Business data are focused on specific regulatory or legal reforms, and as such they are a better indicator of underlying institutions. At the same time, they are sufficiently micro-measured so as to avoid the possibility of such reforms affecting the usage of natural resources.
We find robust evidence for the negative link between natural resource abundance and growth-enhancing reforms. The estimates imply that a move from the most natural resource rich country (Swaziland) to the poorest (Japan) increases the probability of reform by 44.7 percentage points, a large effect given that the probability of reform in the full sample is only 57.1%. A move from the 75 th percentile to the 25 th percentile on resource abundance equals 10.9 percentage points more reform.
Using alternative measures of natural resource abundance, we find that the likelihood of growth enhancing reforms increases by a high of 50.7 and a low of 23.9
percentage points when we move from the most to the least natural resource abundant country. These results are robust to the inclusion of various proxies for the initial institutional environment, controlling for per capita income, civil conflict, fractionalization within societies, education level and geography.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and main variables. Section 3 shows the main regression results, Section 4 provides robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
Description of the data
The sample consists of 133 countries for which information on our main variables is Porta et al. (1999) and Sachs and Warner (1997) . A definition of all variables and their sources is provided in Table 1 . Summary statistics for the main variables are provided in Table 2 .
Dependent variable
The dependent variable is based on data from the World Bank's Doing Business project. Glaeser et al. (2004) , among others.
Explanatory variables

Resource abundance
The main explanatory variable is a measure of natural resource abundance in a country.
We follow the literature in using the value of primary exports as a percentage of GDP Results using two other measures, net primary exports to GDP ratio and total land area per person, are discussed in the robustness section.
Other determinants of reform
The proclivity to reform is likely to depend on the quality of the broader economic institutions that may determine how governments behave. Further, a number of studies also show that the quality of institutions is inversely correlated with the abundance of natural resources (see, for example, Auty 2001). As some of these studies suggest, greater resource abundance may be a causal factor for the poorer quality of institutions that may in turn lead to a lower incidence of reforms. Nevertheless, we control for a number of alternative proxy measures of broader economic institutions suggested in the previous literature to ensure that our results are on the conservative side.
We begin by controlling for the quality of democracy. Amin and Djankov (2009) show the quality of democracy to be highly correlated with the reform measures discussed above and also known to be inversely correlated with natural resource abundance (see, for example, Ross 2001). We use the "democracy" variable for year
2003, the beginning of the reform period, from the Polity IV data (Democracy). The variable ranges between 0 and 10 with higher values implying a better quality of democracy.
Next, we control for differences in income levels across countries using (log of) Last, starting with the seminal work of Max Weber, a number of studies have highlighted the importance of religion in shaping the quality of institutions. For example, Stulz and Williamson (2003) show that the low level of creditors' protection present in Catholic countries is due to the anti-usury culture pervasive in the Catholic tradition.
Following this literature, we use dummy indicators identifying the main religious group in the country as either Muslim, or Catholic, Protestant and the residual category of all other religions. The source for these indicators is La Porta et al. (1999) .
In addition to these variables, we briefly discuss our results with a number of other controls. Examples include the level of regulation across countries at the beginning of the sample period, the degree of openness of the economy, foreign aid, the level of education, and mortality rate for early European settlers in the previously colonized countries.
Consistent with the literature discussed above, we find a strong link between some of the control variables discussed above and reform. Nevertheless, the negative relationship between natural resource abundance and reform survives these controls.
Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of this relationship controlling for GDP per capita and regional fixed effects.
Empirical results
The main empirical results are provided in Table 3 . The estimated coefficient values and their significance levels are obtained using a logit specification with Huber-White robust standard errors clustered on the country. Without any additional controls, the estimated coefficient of SXP equals -0.317, significant at close to 1% level (column 1). The coefficient estimate implies that a move from the least natural resource abundant country (Japan) to the most (Swaziland) decreases the probability of reform by 44.7 percentage points, a large effect given that the mean value of the dependent variable equals 57.1%.
The corresponding decrease in moving from the 75 th percentile value of SXP to the 25 th percentile value equals 10.9 percentage points.
The estimated coefficient of the SXP variable declines in magnitude on account of each of the controls discussed above except for the civil war dummies (columns 2-10).
However, it remains negative, economically large and statistically significant. The coefficient value is lowest (in absolute value) when we control for Democracy equaling -0.240, significant at close to 5% level (p-value of 0.056, column 2). Even this lowest estimate implies a decrease in the probability of reform by 33.8 percentage points when we move from the least to the most resource abundant country. 4 We find that, controlling for the level of resource abundance, reform is significantly more likely in countries with a higher quality of democracy (column 2), countries that have lower incidence of civil war, are more distant from the equator, are growing faster, and those in the ECA region relative to all other regions. Chances of reform are significantly lower for countries that follow the English common law relative to all other legal traditions. Relative to all other religions, Catholic, Muslim and Protestant countries show a lower probability of reform although this effect is significant only for the Protestant countries (at the 10% level, not shown). In sum, natural resource abundance is associated with much fewer micro-economic reforms, and this association remains strong when we control for various measures of institutional quality.
Robustness
First, we repeat the regression exercise using the OLS method and the Number of Reforms as the dependent variable. The relationship between resource abundance and reform holds (Table 4) . As above, it is weaker in magnitude with the various controls (except for civil war dummies) than otherwise but still large and statistically significant at the 5% level. The estimates in Table 4 imply that without any additional control, a move from the least to the most natural resource abundant country lowers the dependent variable by a large 0.552 (against the mean value of 0.556 of the dependent variable). The corresponding decline with the various controls in place ranges between a low of 0.412 when we control for ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization (columns 9) and a high of 0.631 when we control for the incidence of civil wars (column 5).
Second, we report regression results using PX, the share of primary exports in total merchandise exports as the resource abundance measure (Table 5 ). The main results continue to hold. Without any other controls, a move from the least (Japan) to the most natural resource abundant country (Swaziland) decreases the probability of reform by 40.1 percentage points. With the various controls in place, the decrease ranges between 23.9 (with the region fixed effects control, column 7) and 41.6 (with the rule of law control, column 6).
Next, we use the third measure of resource abundance, Minerals (Table 6) . As above, greater abundance of minerals is associated with a negative effect on the probability of reform and this effect is very large in magnitude. For example, moving from the least (Ethiopia, among others) to the most mineral rich country (Oman) reduces the probability of reform by 44.6 percentage points without any controls (column 1), a low of 29.5 percentage points with the control for Democracy (column 2) and a high of 50.7 percentage points with the region fixed effects in place (column 7). However, these large effects are statistically significant at less than 5% level only in one specification (with the regional effects), insignificant at the 10% level when we control for Democracy and the legal origin of countries (columns 2, 10) and significant at the 10% level in the remaining specifications.
The statistically weaker effect of Minerals on reform is similar to the broader findings in the literature on the resource curse. For example, Stijns (2001) finds that while primary exports to GDP ratio across countries is significantly inversely correlated with GDP per capita growth, mineral abundance shows little evidence of such a resource curse. One reason for this could be that estimates of mineral production are based on approximations, especially for the set of developing countries (Sachs and Warner, 1997) .
Also, the weak results for Minerals in the present paper seem to be driven by two countries, Saudi Arabia and Oman, which show excessively large production of minerals relative to the rest of the countries. Share of minerals in GDP equals 1.51 for Oman and 1.36 for Saudi Arabia. The next highest is Kuwait (0.65) followed by United Arab Emirates (0.59). Excluding Saudi Arabia and Oman from the sample we find that for the specifications in Table 6 , the estimated coefficient of Minerals increased substantially in magnitude ranging between -3.045 and -3.9 compared with -1.287 to -2.38 for the full sample. Further, these estimated coefficients are all significant at less than 1% level.
These larger effects are driven mainly by the exclusion of Saudi Arabia from the sample. Fourth, we check for the stability of the resource abundance-reform relationship by using share of net primary exports in GDP and (log of) land area per person. The former measure of resource abundance yielded results roughly similar to the ones in Table 3 . Its estimated coefficient value was large, negative and significant at close to 1% level in the all the specification. These estimates imply that a move from the smallest to the highest value of net primary exports to GDP ratio decreases the probability of reform in the range of 83.6 percentage points (controlling for region fixed effects) to 66.3 percentage points (controlling for Democracy). We find similar results using land area per person except in two specifications (controlling for regional fixed effects and fractionalization variables) where the estimated coefficient value is statistically weak (significant between 10-20% level). However, even in these weak cases, the relationship is large in magnitude. A move from the smallest to the largest value of land area per person decreases the probability of reform by 18.6 percentage points controlling for regional fixed effects and 23.8 percentage points controlling for ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization. The corresponding decline with no additional controls equals 35.1 percentage points (p-value of 0.017).
Finally, we performed a number of additional robustness checks on the results reported in Tables 3-6 . These checks include following Rodrik (1999b) remains robust to all these checks except when we control for settler mortality, a result most likely due to the smaller sample size (we lose 87 countries, which have no data on settler mortality).
5 Foreign aid is defined as net official development assistance (ODA) which consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote economic development and welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients. Data source for the variable is World Development Indicators, World Bank.
Conclusion
Prior to the mid-1980s, the conventional wisdom was that the abundance of natural resources contributed positively to economic growth. More recent studies have shown that the opposite may be true.
A logical channel for this deleterious effect is that the incentive to build good economic institutions through growth enhancing reforms is low in natural resource abundant countries. The present study puts this idea to the test by using data on microeconomic reforms over the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . The findings confirm yet another form of a "natural resource curse." That is, the proclivity to improve the general business environment is significantly lower in natural resource abundant countries.
Figure 1
The figure is a partial scatter plot showing the relationship between Reform and SXP on average over the sample period, and controlling for GDP per capita and regional fixed effects. The Y axis plots the residuals from the linear regression of Reform on the control variables while the X axis contains residuals from a similar regression using SXP. Both these regressions are run over average values of all the variables taken over the sample period (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . Abbreviations of country names follow the World Development Indicators, World Bank. The figure is a partial scatter plot showing the relationship between Reform and Minerals on average over the sample period, and controlling for GDP per capita and regional fixed effects. The Y axis plots the residuals from the linear regression of Reform on the control variables while the X axis contains residuals from a similar regression using Minerals. Both these regressions are run over average values of all the variables taken over the sample period (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . Abbreviations of country names follow the World Development Indicators, World Bank, for example SAU: Saudi Arabia and OMN: Oman. Reform and Mineral Abundance Porta et. al. (1999) . Catholic Dummy indicating the main religion in the country is Catholicism. Source: La Porta et. al. (1999) . Protestant Dummy indicating the main religion in the country is Protestantism. Source: La Porta et. al. (1999) . All other religions Dummy indicating main religion is other than Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism. Source: La Porta et. al. (1999) . 
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